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ABSTRACT
A malicious attacker can drain the batteries of Internet of Things (IoT) devices by
sending many wake up radio (WUR) transmissions. Accordingly, techniques are provided
herein to enable an Access Point (AP) to detect any malicious WUR requests. The AP may
intelligently mitigate the attack with the help of the stations (STAs).
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
802.11ba seeks to increase battery life span for Wi-Fi® based Internet of Things
(IoT) devices by allowing the primary device to enter a sleep mode with a low-power wake
up radio (WUR) listening for wake up transmissions. A malicious attacker can drain
batteries by sending many of these WUR transmissions.
There are currently no adequate security procedures to protect against WUR replay
attacks. For example, the station (STA) may be re-keyed to a new Identifier (ID), if the AP
detects that the STA is under attack. This is an unsustainable model if the attacker is
replaying all of the AP’s Wakeup Requests, as there will be too many re-key attempts and
all the STAs are attempting to communicate traffic to the AP.
The mechanism described herein uses dedicated monitor radios on APs that scan
for 802.11ba wake up transmissions (WUTs) and attempt to detect malicious behavior.
Malicious behavior may be detected using the monitor mode radio on the AP to detect
whether the AP’s packets are being replayed. The AP may also search for an unsolicited
response from the STA’s primary radio. In another example, the AP may search for
instances where the WUT misrepresents itself as an AP on the network. This may involve
tracking baseband characteristics of the WUT frame and comparing to those of known APs
for mismatches.
If a malicious WUT device is identified, the network AP with a monitor radio may
mitigate the attack by interfering with the WUT. For example, when a WUT from the
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malicious device is initially detected, the monitor radio may insert an On/Off key
transmission that will be synchronized with the destination Media Access Control (MAC)
address field of the WUT frame to modify the destination MAC to an unused dummy MAC
(e.g., timely jamming) to cause the victim IoT device to ignore the WUT frame. This may
involve estimating the transmission level required to match the receiver level at the victim
device, the WUT frame from the attacker based on the WUT preamble, and the time
synchronization to the WUT.
Since the unwanted device has been previously identified, a positive ID using the
preamble may be obtained. The following metrics may be used: (1) Angle of Arrival (AoA)
at the AP based on a cross-correlation of the preamble across a switched antenna array or
across a simple multiple antenna AP; (2) Carrier Frequency Offset (CFO) based on an
estimate provided by the preamble; (3) channel matrix based on the preamble after CFO
correction; and (4) ripple in the Broadband (BB) filter across subcarriers (i.e., the locations
of the nulls and peaks).
Furthermore, the AP may indicate to the STA that there is a malicious WUT in the
vicinity. The STA can then learn which WUTs are from real APs as opposed to malicious
attackers over time by learning the PHY parameters. This may include monitoring the
Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) of the WUR request from the AP, the carrier
offset of the WUR request from the AP, and the start-of-packet parameters involving the
SYNC field.
The learning may involve a very simple classification using maximum likelihood
or other basic techniques. For complicated attacks where higher resources are available at
the STA, additional factors and techniques may be used.
The AP may search for the malicious WUT and determine whether to trigger STAs
to perform additional processing, if necessary. There may be situations where the AP
chooses to ignore the attack, or selectively notify only some STAs to begin monitoring.
The AP may choose the STAs based on factors such as which STAs are experiencing the
most false positives for primary radio wake up. If STAs are very resource constrained, the
APs may choose not to let the STA perform additional mitigation processing.
A WUT frame replay may be detected even if the WUT frame does not contain a
sequence ID. Since the WUT frame is transmitted by the AP, the AP may maintain the state
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and easily detect a replay. One example is to identify a WUT having the transmit address
of the AP, but which the AP has not sent.
It may be determined that a WUT misrepresented itself as an AP on the network
based on an excessive frequency. The excessive frequency can be determined by
monitoring a successful WUT. For example, consider a STA that receives a WUT, wakes
up the primary radio, and then realizes that there are no packets queued at the AP for the
STA. Every time such a state is reached, the STA may increment a counter X. If such a
state is reached multiple times frequently (e.g., greater than X times in a second), the STA
may determine that this is excessive.
Radio Frequency (RF) technology is local and varies with many parameters (e.g.,
multipath, etc.). However, overall the transmission from a well behaved AP usually follows
a Gaussian distribution with a 7dB standard deviation for indoor applications. Also, APs
tend to send certain packets at a fixed data rate and hence transmit power. This is practically
true for packets such as beacons, probe responses, Ready to Send (RTS) packets, Clear to
Send (CTS) packets, etc. Therefore, a malicious attacker would have to transmit a WUT
with an exact power so as to emulate the Gaussian distribution. This is not the only way to
detect a WUT attack, and may be used in conjunction with other techniques provided herein
(e.g., carrier offset, etc.). For example, STAs in 802.11ba are IoT STAs and most likely
have some kind of motion detection sensors to further build confidence in these techniques
and make sure they have not moved.
In summary, a malicious attacker can drain the batteries of IoT devices by sending
many WUR transmissions. Accordingly, techniques are provided herein to enable an AP
to detect any malicious WUR requests. The AP may intelligently mitigate the attack with
the help of the STAs.
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